



OPORD 26-114 · ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) · SERIAL 04

Hoburg Bank

Commander's dossier · Operation CTF-401 BALTIC SENTINEL, sequence HOBURG · 14 October 2026

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You have six hours, five warships, a submarine nobody knows about, and a rule that says you may not shoot first. Somewhere under the keel of a twenty-seven-year-old bulk carrier, an anchor is dragging across the cables that carry Lithuania's electricity.

1 Situation

1.1 Why anyone is here at all

Operation Baltic Sentry has held since January 2025. For eighteen months the combination of standing patrols, aerial surveillance and — more to the point — the visible willingness of Baltic states to board and detain, brought the rate of "accidental" anchor damage down to near zero. That ended in March 2026.


The method has not changed since the Estlink-2 affair: an ageing hull under a flag of convenience, a mixed crew, insurance that unravels when you pull on it, and an anchor walked across the seabed for forty or fifty miles. What has changed is the escort. Since the Øresund incident of 26 February — a drone launched from the intelligence ship *Zhigulevsk* entering Swedish airspace over Malmö — the Baltic Fleet has stopped pretending these vessels are strangers. It accompanies them, and it contests any attempt to board them on freedom-of-navigation grounds.

That is the whole of the problem you have been handed. The legal instrument that lets you board is real. The force that will object to you using it is also real, and it is closer to the incident than you are.

1.2 The ground, which in this case is the seabed

Hoburg Bank and the Northern Midsjö Bank, south-east of Gotland, are where the Baltic's undersea infrastructure converges. NordBalt runs Sweden to Lithuania. The BCS East-West Interlink runs Sweden to Estonia. C-Lion1 runs Helsinki to Rostock. Depths over the crest are fifteen to twenty-five metres on soft sediment — which is why an anchor holds there just enough to do damage, and not enough to stop the ship.

FIGURE 1 – DEPTH PROFILE ALONG THE DRAG TRACK, 068°



The dashed red line is the assessed track of the anchor. Three cable systems cross the bank inside twelve nautical miles of each other. This is not a coincidence of geography that the other side has failed to notice.

1.3 The trigger

At 0341Z the bulk carrier **M/V SOLVEIG ARROW** — IMO 9143388, Comoros flag, 45 000 dwt, hull laid down in 1999, last port Ust-Luga — switched off her AIS transponder twelve nautical miles north of the NordBalt corridor.

She had already been slowing for forty minutes. Swedish Navy surface radar has held her continuously since 0410Z, making 3.2 knots on a heading of 068 with no sign of a main-engine fault and no distress call. At that draught, on that bottom, 3.2 knots is what a ship makes when something is in the mud behind her.

FIGURE 2 – M/V SOLVEIG ARROW, SPEED OVER GROUND, 0000Z–0430Z



Solid line: the vessel's own AIS broadcast. Dashed: the Swedish Navy radar track after the transponder went off at 0341Z. The shape of that deceleration — gradual over forty minutes, then flat — is the signature. An engine casualty looks nothing like it.

Twenty-two nautical miles to the north-west, the Norwegian cable ship **NCS ENDEAVOUR** is working under contract to Svenska kraftnät with her ROV in the water. She is unarmed, slow, and entirely dependent on you.

THE THING TO UNDERSTAND BEFORE YOU START

Stopping the SOLVEIG ARROW is the mission. It is also the act that gives Moscow its pretext. Both of those are true at the same time, and nothing in this dossier resolves the tension for you. That is the decision the Council has delegated to the officer reading this page.

2 Enemy

2.1 Where this section comes from

The disposition that follows is an **ATHENA-M product**. ATHENA-M is the alliance maritime fusion cell at Rota: it correlates AIS histories, ELINT bearings from RIVET 90 and the Gotland ground stations, optical and SAR satellite passes, acoustic reporting, and open commercial vessel-tracking data, and it proposes tracks with an explicit confidence.

It is a tool, not an oracle. Every line below carries the confidence ATHENA assigned it and the basis it was assigned on. Read the basis column before you act on the row.

CONFIDENCE SCALE

CONFIRMED

A current sensor hold, or two independent sources agreeing inside the last hour. Manoeuvre on it.

PROBABLE

One source, or a cross-fix with a stated error box. Plan for it, verify before committing weapons.

POSSIBLE

Pattern-of-life inference or a stale fix. ATHENA is telling you where something usually is, not where it is.

UNLOCATED


Known to exist, known to be at sea, not held. The most dangerous line in any intelligence product is the one that is blank.

2.2 Assessed disposition, 0430Z

TRACK	CONTACT	CLASS / ROLE	POSITION 0430Z	CONFIDENCE	BASIS
H-0011	Zhigulevsk	Pr.864 Vishnya AGI — SIGINT, embarked UAV	56°22'N 018°48'E	CONFIRMED	Continuous radar hold since 0206Z; visual by ARGUS 01 at 0418Z
H-0014	Soobrazitelnyy	Pr.20380 corvette — Kh-35U, Redut	56°05'N 019°10'E	CONFIRMED	Radar hold; Monolit-T emissions classified at 0357Z
H-0019	Odintsovo	Pr.22800 Karakurt — Kalibr, Pantsir-M	55°52'N 019°25'E	PROBABLE	ELINT cross-fix at 0402Z, ±11 nm. No radar hold.
H-0023	B-227 Vyborg	Pr.877V Kilo SSK	—	UNLOCATED	Sailed Kronstadt 1640Z / 12 Oct. No contact in 36 h. See 2.5.

TRACK	CONTACT	CLASS / ROLE	POSITION 0430Z	CONFIDENCE	BASIS
A-0102	COOT 01	II-20M Coot-A — ELINT	54°54'N 019°30'E, FL200	CONFIRMED	Squawking; racetrack orbit flown since 0215Z
S-0301	Baltiysk	2 Pr.21631 Buyan-M, 2 Pr.1241.8 Molniya alongside	54°39'N 019°54'E	CONFIRMED	Optical satellite pass 0338Z. Both Buyan-M with crews embarked, boilers lit.
S-0304	Chernyakhovsk	4 Su-30SM2, 4 Su-24M2	54°36'N 021°22'E	CONFIRMED	Pattern-of-life; two airframes at cockpit alert since 0300Z
S-0311	Bastion-P, Donskoye	K-300P, 2 launchers, P-800 Oniks	54°56'N 019°58'E	CONFIRMED	Monolit-B radar radiating intermittently since 0244Z
S-0315	S-400, Gvardeysk	2 battalions, 48N6DM + 40N6	54°39'N 021°04'E	CONFIRMED	92N6 engagement radar up at 0410Z
S-0322	Nebo-M	55Zh6M, RLM-M VHF	54°45'N 020°36'E	PROBABLE	VHF emitter located by RIVET 90; type inferred from waveform
S-0327	R-330Zh Zhitel	GNSS / comms jammer	54°43'N 020°30'E ±6 nm	POSSIBLE	No emissions yet. Sited from the October 2025 deployment, not from today.

FIGURE 3 – COMMON OPERATING PICTURE, 0430Z



Allied and neutral tracks are held. Russian tracks are drawn at the confidence ATHENA assigned them: solid for confirmed, dashed for probable, finely dotted for possible, faint for unlocated. This is the picture you own — not the picture that exists.

2.3 What the Baltic Fleet is likely to do

MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION

Escort and obstruct. The *Zhigulevsk* stays between you and the bulker, close enough to make a boarding approach awkward and to film whatever you do. Chernyakhovsk flies a show-of-force CAP. Kaliningrad degrades your navigation with the R-330Zh. Nothing is fired. The cables are cut, the political cost is paid by NATO, and the Baltic Fleet goes home having "escorted merchant shipping".

MOST DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION

The same, until you board. ATHENA assesses with **moderate confidence** that an allied boarding of the SOLVEIG ARROW would be answered inside two hours by sailing the Buyan-M pair with weapon release delegated, under a live-fire area declaration already drafted. The corvettes carry Kalibr. From Baltiysk they are inside range of your operating area


before they clear the Vistula Spit.

ATHENA's reasoning on that point is drawn from the Kaliningrad response to the Estonian boarding of the *Kiwala* in April 2025, and from Baltic Fleet exercise patterns in June 2026. It is an analogy, not a forecast.

2.4 What you are operating inside

The whole of your operating area sits under the Bastion-P envelope at Donskoye and inside the outer S-400 ring at Gvardeysk. You cannot suppress either without starting the war this operation exists to prevent. Plan around them; do not plan to remove them.

FIGURE 4 – WEAPON ENGAGEMENT ZONES, ASSESSED



Ranges are the assessed maximum against a surface or air target with third-party targeting; they are drawn as great circles from the assessed launcher positions, not as marketing figures. The allied RBS-15 ring from Gotland is shown for comparison — note what it covers, and what firing it would mean.

2.5 What ATHENA cannot tell you

The Kilo. B-227 *Vyborg* sailed from Kronstadt at 1640Z on 12 October and has not been held since. Thirty-six hours at a patrol speed puts her anywhere in the southern Baltic, including underneath your formation. ATHENA has declined to offer a most-likely position, and it is right to decline. Treat the absence of a submarine contact as the absence of information, not as the absence of a submarine.

The jammer. The R-330Zh position is carried at POSSIBLE because it is where the system sat during the October 2025 deployment and nothing has radiated since. If it is where ATHENA thinks it is, GNSS degradation across your force is a matter of when. If it has moved forward, the degradation will be worse and will arrive sooner.

The crew. Nothing in this dossier tells you who is aboard the SOLVEIG ARROW, whether they will resist a boarding, or whether there is anyone aboard qualified to weigh an anchor under pressure. The vessel has changed registered owner three times in fourteen months. The current owner is a company in Mauritius with one director and no other vessels.

2.6 Vessel file — M/V SOLVEIG ARROW

- Handymax dry-bulk carrier, 45 000 dwt, built 1999, 189 m LOA, single screw.
- Flag: Comoros since March 2026. Previously Panama, previously Cook Islands.
- Class: withdrawn by her IACS society in 2024. Currently carried by a society not on the IACS list.
- Insurance: a P&I cover from an entity that does not appear in the International Group.
- Last four voyages all Ust-Luga or Primorsk to destinations that changed mid-passage.
- Port state control: detained twice in 2025, both times for anchor and windlass defects. Read that line twice.

2.7 Vessel file — *Zhigulevsk*

- Project 864 Vishnya-class intelligence collector, commissioned 1988, 3 400 t.
- Comprehensive HF/VHF/UHF and radar intercept; satellite downlink.
- Carries a small UAV detachment. Orlan-10 assessed. This is the ship that launched the Øresund drone on 26 February.
- Lightly armed: two AK-630 close-in mounts, MANPADS. She is not a threat to your ships. She is a threat to your legal position.

3 Friendly forces

SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE – TU 401.1 AND 401.2

UNIT	CLASS	FLAG	POSITION 0430Z	NOTES
HSwMS <i>Visby</i>	K31 Visby-class corvette	SWE	56°42'N 018°20'E	Stealth, ASW, RBS-15 Mk3. Full EW fit.
HSwMS <i>Nyköping</i>	K34 Visby-class corvette	SWE	56°38'N 018°32'E	As above, plus ROV and surface drone
HSwMS <i>Carlskrona</i>	P04 offshore patrol vessel	SWE	56°55'N 018°05'E	Boarding party embarked. Hkp 15 on deck.
FGS <i>Sachsen</i>	F219 Type F124 frigate	DEU	56°30'N 017°55'E	Area AAW: SM-2 IIIA, ESSM, APAR / SMART-L
FGS <i>Braunschweig</i>	F260 Type K130 corvette	DEU	56°26'N 018°10'E	RBS-15 Mk3
HSwMS <i>Uppland</i>	Gotland-class SSK	SWE	56°05'N 018°55'E, 40 m	Not declared. Four days on patrol. AIP, ace crew.

AIR COMPONENT

CALLSIGN	TYPE	BASE	STATE AT 0430Z	NOTES
QUID 11 / 12	2 × JAS 39C Gripen	F17 Ronneby	AIRBORNE, FL240	AMRAAM / IRIS-T. On CAP HOBURG.
ARGUS 01	S 100B Argus (Saab 340 AEW)	F17 Ronneby	AIRBORNE, FL200	Erieye. The picture depends on it.
RIVET 90	RC-135V Rivet Joint	Mildenhall	AIRBORNE, FL300	Sensor only. Do not commit.
NEPTUNE 70	P-8A Poseidon	Keflavík, diverted	INBOUND, on station T+50	Mk54, DIFAR / DICASS / VLAD
QUID 13 / 14	2 × JAS 39C Gripen	F17 Ronneby	ALERT 5	Air-to-air fit
QUID 21–24	4 × JAS 39C Gripen	F17 Ronneby	ALERT 30	RB 15F Mk2 anti-ship
VIKING 51 / 52	2 × EF2000 Typhoon	Rostock-Laage	ALERT 15	Air policing fit
LIGHTNING 31–34	4 × F-35A (NLD, eFP)	Ämari	ALERT 30	Internal AMRAAM only
HAWK 61	Hkp 14F (NH90 NFH)	Visby Flygplats	ALERT 30	ASW. Too heavy for the Visby-class deck.

UNIT	POSITION	REACH	NOTES
RBS-15 Mk4 Gungnir battery	57°06'N 018°25'E	200 km+	Gotlands regemente. Firing it is a strategic act, not a tactical one.
PS-860 / Giraffe radar	57°27'N 018°30'E	–	Low-level cover over the northern approach
Patriot PAC-3 battery	57°38'N 018°18'E	–	Luftvärnsregementet. Defends the Gotland posture, not the task group.

CIVIL TRAFFIC IN THE AREA

VESSEL	TYPE	POSITION 0430Z	STATUS
M/V SOLVEIG ARROW	Handymax bulker, 45 000 dwt	56°18'N 018°42'E	The problem. 3.2 kt, 068°, anchor down. No VHF response.
NCS ENDEAVOUR	Cable / support vessel	56°33'N 018°18'E	Protected. Svenska kraftnät contract, ROV on the surface.
M/V BALTIC TRADER	Feedermax container	56°48'N 019°12'E	Routine. AIS nominal.
M/V KLAIPEDA STAR	Feedermax container	55°54'N 020°12'E	Routine. AIS nominal.
M/V GDANSK PIONEER	Feedermax container	55°24'N 018°00'E	Routine. AIS nominal.

THE TWO ASSETS THAT DECIDE THIS

HSwMS *Carlskrona* carries the boarding party. She is also the slowest useful unit you have and the one least able to defend herself. Everything about the timing of this operation is really a question about where she is.

HSwMS *Uppland* is not declared to anyone. She is the only card you hold that the other side has not counted. Used early, she is a submarine on a plot. Used late, she is the reason the Buyan-M pair never reaches firing position.

4 Mission and intent

CTF-401 prevents damage to the undersea infrastructure at Hoburg Bank, protects NCS ENDEAVOUR, and maintains allied presence inside the declared area — without firing first.

COMMANDER'S INTENT

The purpose of CTF-401 BALTIC SENTINEL is to demonstrate that the alliance can stop this happening without handing Russia a shooting incident. The end state I want at 1030Z is an intact cable network, an intact task group, a merchant vessel stopped and under our observation, and a signal log that shows we never illuminated a Russian unit in fire control.

I accept losing a cable before I accept starting a war. I do not accept losing both. If the choice narrows to that, stop the ship.

5 Rules of engagement — ROE SIERRA

These are the rules as issued, with the gloss the staff attached to each. The gloss is not authority. Where the two differ, the rule governs.

1 Weapons tight. Engagement is authorised only in demonstrated self-defence: hostile fire observed, or a fire-control lock followed by an approach in attack profile.

In practice: a lock alone is not enough. A lock plus a closing run at low level is. The Su-24M2 crews know exactly where that line is and will fly up to it. Holding fire through a simulated attack run is the single hardest thing this operation will ask of your air controllers.

2 Boarding of SOLVEIG ARROW is authorised in international waters under the submarine cable convention. Non-lethal force only.

In practice: you have the legal instrument. You do not have the authority to shoot your way onto the deck. If the boarding is physically opposed, you disengage and report — you do not escalate to make it work.

3 Entry into Russian territorial waters — twelve nautical miles off Kaliningrad — is prohibited.

In practice: this constrains pursuit. If the bulker runs south-east, there is a line past which she is gone and you stop.

4 Active jamming is authorised. Jamming of civil GNSS is not.

In practice: this is your answer to the drone. The Visby pair carries the electronic-warfare fit to do it, and it costs you nothing politically. Reach for it before you reach for a missile.

5 Any unprovoked opening of fire will be treated as a failure of the operation regardless of the tactical outcome.

In practice: there is no tactical success available that redeems firing first. Northwood has been explicit about this in a way it rarely is.

6 Execution

PHASE 1 – ESTABLISH (NOW TO T+45)

Close the SOLVEIG ARROW with a Visby-class unit for visual and EW coverage. Bring *Carlskrona* forward. *Sachsen* takes station where her SM-2 envelope covers both the boarding position and the ENDEAVOUR. Hail on channel 16 and record everything.


PHASE 2 – RESOLVE (T+45 TO T+2H15)

Board, or compel the vessel to weigh anchor by presence. Every minute in this phase is cable. The first system parts at roughly T+1h45 on current drag rate; the second at T+2h15.

PHASE 3 – HOLD (T+2H15 TO ENDEX)

Whatever happened in phase 2, you remain inside the declared area with an intact task group and the ENDEAVOUR under cover. If the Baltic Fleet sails, this becomes an air-defence problem and *Sachsen* becomes the centre of your formation rather than its flank.

FIGURE 5 – THE INCIDENT BOX IN DETAIL



The red track is the drag reconstructed from AIS and radar; the dashed continuation is the projection at current speed and heading. Note where it crosses the amber cable corridor, and note how little sea room there is between the boarding position and the declared firing area.

7 How you will be judged

Northwood will assess the sequence against the following. They are listed in the order they matter.

OUTCOME	EFFECT ON THE ASSESSMENT
SOLVEIG ARROW stopped before the first cable parts	Strongly positive — the mission accomplished as written
Stopped after the first cut but before the second	Positive — NordBalt saved
No allied round fired for the whole sequence	Strongly positive — the political objective
CTF-401 fires first on a Russian military unit	Strongly negative — the sequence is judged a failure however it ends
SOLVEIG ARROW sunk	Severely negative — an unarmed merchant in international waters
NCS ENDEAVOUR lost	Negative — the protected unit
Task group intact through an armed Russian response	Positive — you were right and you survived being right

DIFFICULTY, FOR THE PLAYER RATHER THAN THE COMMANDER

Three axes out of five, then the pair a Command scenario is published with.

TACTICAL

2/5

You hold air superiority, an AEW aircraft that sees everything, and a P-8A that covers the ASW barrier alone. No ammunition problem, no hard detection problem.

The one passage that demands real handling is the Buyan-M sortie — and only if you triggered it.

OPERATIONAL

3/5

Everything you push forward sits inside somebody's weapon engagement zone, and you cannot remove either envelope. The reserve is real but slow, so committing it is a bet placed thirty minutes early. Holding presence inside a declared firing area with an intact group is the whole operational problem.

DECISION-MAKING

4/5

The assessment punishes action. Yet the vessel cutting the cables is the one you are least free to touch, and stopping her is what releases the corvettes. No option is clean on every axis. The drone at T+1h is the same trap in miniature: unarmed, inside your bubble, expensive to shoot.

COMMAND RATING

The two figures a Command scenario is normally published with. They measure different things and this scenario deliberately pulls them apart.

AXIS	RATING	WHAT IT MEASURES	WHY THIS VALUE
Complexity	2 / 5	How much there is to <i>run</i> : force size actually under orders, number of simultaneous problems, depth of planning and micromanagement demanded.	Sixty-seven units on the map, but barely a dozen need an order from you. One surface group, one CAP, one ASW barrier already assigned, two special actions. No strike package to build, no tanker plan, no logistics. A player who has finished the tutorials can run it.
Difficulty	4 / 5	How likely you are to fail: severity of the opposition, tightness of the constraints, and how far the winning line sits from the obvious one.	The scoring punishes the action the situation seems to demand, the optimal path costs you the quiet, and the single most tempting move on the board — shooting the drone — is the one that sinks the run. Most first attempts end below the line not because the player was outfought but because he was out-argued.

A low complexity with a high difficulty is the signature of a grey-zone scenario. If you want the opposite — high complexity, moderate difficulty — the *Hard ROE* variant in the design notes turns this into a conventional naval battle, which is harder to fly and far easier to win.

8 Provenance

Everything above is written as though it were real. This section takes the mask off, because a scenario built on real events is worth more when you can see which parts are real.

8.1 The operation this one sits inside

Baltic Sentry is a real NATO activity, launched on 15 January 2025 after the Estlink-2 cable cutting. It reinforced **Commander Task Force Baltic**, a German-led headquarters stood up at Rostock in October 2024 with around ninety naval officers, with additional frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones. Its method is deterrence by presence rather than enforcement — which is precisely the frustration this scenario puts in the player's hands.

CTF-401 is invented. No task force of that designation exists. The 400 series was chosen because it collides with nothing in service. The real Baltic Sentry forces work under Commander Task Force Baltic, which does not carry a numbered CTF designation of this kind.

8.2 Where ATHENA-M comes from

The fusion cell in section 2 is invented, but the idea is not. **Nordic Warden** is a real UK-led activity, also launched in January 2025, which uses artificial intelligence to assess the risk posed by vessels of interest across some two dozen areas of the Baltic, North Sea and Irish Sea, and warns allies and the vessels themselves. ATHENA-M is what that kind of system would look like if it produced a formal J2 annex with confidence gradings — and the scenario's deliberate uncertainties, above all the unlocated Kilo, are the argument that such a system remains a tool rather than an oracle.

8.3 The incidents the scenario is assembled from

DATE	INCIDENT	WHAT IT CONTRIBUTES HERE
26 Sep 2022	Nord Stream 1 & 2 destroyed	The event that turned Baltic seabed infrastructure into a security problem rather than an engineering one.
7–8 Oct 2023	Balticconnector pipeline and the EE-S1 cable damaged; the Chinese-owned <i>Newnew Polar Bear</i> suspected	The vessel reached Russian waters before the coastal states could coordinate a response, and was never detained. This is the reason the scenario runs a clock: every minute of deliberation is a minute the ship is still moving.
18 Nov 2024	BCS East-West Interlink and C-Lion1 cut; the bulk carrier <i>Yi Peng 3</i> suspected	Shadowed by several navies and stopped in Danish waters, but not boardable — access came only on 20 December, under Chinese supervision and for a truncated visit. The legal constraint at the centre of ROE SIERRA is taken directly from this case. Both of these cables are the ones being cut in the scenario.
25 Dec 2024	Estlink-2 and four data cables cut; the Cook Islands–flagged tanker <i>Eagle S</i> boarded and detained by Finland inside its EEZ	The precedent that makes a boarding thinkable at all, and it was contested at the time. The scenario's boarding authority exists because Finland did this first.

DATE	INCIDENT	WHAT IT CONTRIBUTES HERE
26 Jan 2025	Sweden–Latvia cable damaged; the Maltese-flagged <i>Vezhen</i> escorted into Swedish waters and seized	The investigation was shelved because intent could not be proved, and ship and crew were released. Stopping the ship is not the same as proving sabotage — which is why the scenario scores you on stopping her, not on convicting anyone.
31 Dec 2025	Elisa data cable damaged; the <i>Fitburg</i> under investigation	The most recent entry in the public record, and the evidence that the eighteen-month lull the briefing describes was real but fragile.
1981–1982	Swedish submarine incidents — <i>Whiskey on the Rocks</i>, then the <i>Hårsfjärden</i> hunt	The older Swedish problem of prosecuting an intruder you cannot positively identify, under rules written for peacetime. HSwMS <i>Uppland</i> 's role and the whole attribution theme descend from it.

8.4 What is real in the order of battle

The military units, bases and systems are real and are placed where they actually are. Baltiysk, Chernyakhovsk and Chkalovsk are the Baltic Fleet's bases. Bastion-P at Donskoye and S-400 at Gvardeysk are real deployments, and the envelopes in figure 4 are drawn from published ranges. The Visby-class corvettes, the Type F124 *Sachsen*, the Gotland-class submarines with their air-independent propulsion, the RBS-15 battery on Gotland and the Patriot at Visby all exist. So do NordBalt, the BCS East-West Interlink, C-Lion1, Hoburg Bank and the Northern Midsjö Bank, at the depths given.

The shadow-fleet profile in section 2.6 — flag changed three times in fourteen months, class withdrawn by an IACS society, insurance outside the International Group, a single-director owning company, port-state detentions for windlass defects — is a composite of the real pattern, not a description of any one ship.

8.5 What is invented

- **M/V SOLVEIG ARROW**, her IMO number, owners and history. Any resemblance to a real vessel is unintended.
- **NCS ENDEAVOUR**. Svenska kraftnät does contract cable ships; this is not one of them.
- **CTF-401**, OPOD 26-114, ROE SIERRA and the ATHENA-M cell.
- **The Øresund drone incident of 26 February 2026**, and the *Zhigulevsk*'s part in it. This is scenario backstory. It is built on the real pattern of drone sightings over Nordic airports and on the real existence of UAV detachments aboard intelligence collectors, but the incident itself did not happen.
- **Everything dated 2026**: the dispositions, the readiness states, the NOTAM, the named individuals aboard anything. The scenario is set four months after this dossier was written and is a projection, not a forecast.

8.6 Sources

- [Baltic Sea underwater infrastructure incidents](#) — the incident chronology used above
- [How the Baltic Sea nations have tackled suspicious cable cuts](#), Atlantic Council — boardings, detentions and why they were contested
- [NATO launches Baltic Sentry mission in the Baltic Sea](#), USNI News, 15 January 2025
- [NATO launches Baltic Sentry to protect undersea infrastructure](#), gCaptain
- [The 2024 Estlink-2 incident](#)
- [Baltic Sentry](#), SHAPE / NATO

Prepared for the Command: Modern Operations scenario **CTF-401 Baltic Sentinel — The Hoburg Bank Incident**. Every assessment in this dossier is written from inside CTF-401's picture at 0430Z: it is what the commander believes, which is not the same as what is true. Where the dossier is wrong, that is the design.

Civilian vessel names, the IMO number, the ATHENA-M cell and all intelligence products here are invented. Military units, bases, weapon systems and their ranges are real; their presence on this date is a projection. Coastline from GSHHS full-resolution shorelines, Mercator projection, WGS 84.

NATO SECRET — REL FIN/SWE — EXERCISE — THIS IS A FICTIONAL DOCUMENT